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The Actorness of the European Union in Arctic Governance
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This is a pre-print of an article whose final version was published in 
European Foreign Affairs Review 16(2): 227-242.
This article analyses the actorness of the European Union in Arctic governance. As a result of  
melting ice caps, this region is of increasing geopolitical and commercial importance. All  
Arctic coastal states have therefore recently developed policies.  The European Union has  
done so as well, as it has a direct interest in many issue areas. Maritime policy in the Arctic  
region affects European transport companies, environmental issues relate to the EU's policy  
on climate change, and border delimitations is  relevant  as it  gives access  to  new energy  
sources. In these different issue areas, the degree of EU actorness, however, varies. With the  
exception of the negotiations over the legal status of the Northwest Passage, the European  
Union mainly plays a role regarding non-regulatory and non-binding issues. It has thus far  
been kept out of talks of a regulatory and binding nature. This variation across issue areas  
shows the limited role of the European Union as an international actor in Arctic governance,  
despite the region's acknowledged increasing importance.
I Introduction
It  has  been  notoriously  difficult  for  the  European  Union  to  participate  in  international 
relations and global governance due to its lack of a state-like status. Scholars have therefore 
unsurprisingly spent considerable time trying to conceptualise the EU’s international role.1 
They  have  provided  useful  yardsticks  against  which  the  'actorness'  and  'presence'  of  the 
European Union in the international arena can be measured empirically. This article looks, in 
this context, at the emerging role of the EU in Arctic governance – a region where all coastal 
states with an interest are currently developing policies, as the topic rises in salience, and 
where also the European Union has a major stake.2 It fits in with other empirical studies of EU 
* Moritz Pieper, Markus Winter and Anika Wirtz are graduate students respectively at the University of Kent/Higher 
School of Economics in Moscow, Russian Federation, the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo, 
Japan, and the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, Germany. Hylke Dijkstra is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences of Maastricht University, The Netherlands.
1 G. Sjöstedt, The External Role of the European Community (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 
1977); D. Allen & M. Smith, ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’, Review of 
International Studies 16, no. 1 (1990): 19-37; C. Bretherton & J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor 
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Environment Politics’, in The European Union in the World Community, ed. C. Rhodes (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1998), 213-229.
2 Russia’s Arctic Strategy, 2009, available at <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html>; Canada’s Arctic Strategy, 
actorness and aims to contribute to this debate.3
As one of the last territorially unsettled regions in the world, the Arctic has increasingly 
received attention with states becoming aware of its geo-strategic importance. First, the Arctic 
is thought to be rich of undiscovered resources with more than ten percent of the world’s 
known petroleum.4 Because  territorial  possession will  allow for  resource  exploitation and 
energy security,  the five Arctic  coastal  states (Russia,  Norway, United States of America,  
Canada, and Denmark) have entered in a flexing of muscles to ascertain their sovereignty. 
Almost all of them have stepped up their military activities in the region.5 Second, climate 
change  has  been  considered  a  particularly  pressing  concern  for  the  Arctic.  Calls  for 
environmental  protection have become louder and they have been a driving force for the 
creation  of  the  Arctic  Council  in  1996.  Third,  Arctic  melting  provides  new  commercial 
opportunities in terms of important sea routes.6 The legal status of the Northwest Passage, 
connecting the Atlantic with the Pacific, has heated up the international race for the North 
Pole area. 
Since 2008, the European Commission and the Council of Ministers have put the Arctic 
on the European agenda.7 The Commission, for example, noted that environmental changes 
“are  altering  the  geo-strategic  dynamics  of  the  Arctic  with  potential  consequences  for 
international stability and European security interests calling for the development of an EU 
Arctic policy”.8 The Arctic is thus of direct relevance for the EU’s energy security as well as 
environmental  and maritime policy.  Yet,  as  this  article  will  show, the participation of the 
European  Union  in  Arctic  governance  varies  considerable  across  issue  areas.  The  EU is 
strongly involved in  policy areas  of  a  non-regulatory  and non-binding nature,  while  it  is 
excluded from issues of regulatory governance – with the dispute over the Northwest Passage 
being the notable exception.
This  article  shortly  discusses  the  academic  literature  on  actorness.  It  explains,  in 
particular, the model put forward by Jupille and Caporaso.9 Subsequently, it applies this model 
of  actorness  to  all  important  issue  areas  in  Arctic  governance:  maritime  affairs,  border 
delimitation  (which  includes  future  energy  resources  exploitation),  and  environmental 
protection. In the conclusion, it  discusses the variation of EU actorness across these issue 
areas.
II Actorness and the European Union
The  concept  of  actorness  lies  at  the  core  of  numerous  analyses  of  the  EU’s  role  in  the 
international  arena.  It  was  developed  as  a  result  of  the  increasing  awareness  that  the 
parameters of international  relations theory – with often state-centric  perspectives  – were 
unsuitable for assessing the position of the EU vis-à-vis other actors. The advantage of the 
concept of actorness is that it goes beyond the absoluteness of establishing whether the EU 
2009, available at <http://www.northernstrategy.ca/cns/cns-eng.asp#chp3>; NATO’s Arctic Strategy, 2009, available 
at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_49745.htm?selectedLocale=en>; USA’s Arctic Strategy, 2009, 
available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090112-3.html>.
3 M. L. P. Groenleer & L. G. Van Schaik, ‘United We Stand? The European Union's International Actorness in the 
Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol’, Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 5 
(2007): 969-998; R. Ginsberg, ‘Conceptualising the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the 
Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap’, Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 3 (1999): 429-54; Jupille & 
Caporaso, n. 1 above.
4 US Geological Survey, 2008, available at <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008-3049.pdf>.
5 L. Jakobson, ‘China Prepares For An Ice-Free Arctic’, SIPRI Peace and Security 2 (2010): 1-16, at 7.
6 AMSA, Arctic Council: Arctic Marine Assessment 2009 Report (Tromsø: Arctic Council, 2009). 
7 European Commission, ‘The European Union and the Arctic Region’, Commission of the European Communities, 
COM 763 (Brussels: 2008); Council of Ministers, ‘Council Conclusions on Arctic issues’, Council of the European 
Union, 16826/08 (Brussels, 2009).
8 Commission, n. 7 above, at 2.
9 Jupille & Caporaso, n. 1 above.
bears similarity to one of the great powers, enabling a more detailed look into the unique 
nature of the EU’s foreign policy involvement. Thus, actorness has primarily been used as 
research tool for measuring the role of the EU, which is neither a sovereign state, nor merely 
an international organization.10
First coined by Gunnar Sjöstedt, the concept has been revised by a cadre of scholars in 
recent years.11 Though no universally-recognized criteria for actorness have been developed, it 
is clear that the concept denotes the degree to which an entity constitutes a genuine actor in 
international relations. Two strands of literature can, in this respect, be identified. The first 
focuses on the theoretical  underpinnings of the notion of  actorness.  Drawing upon social  
constructivist  theory,  it  is  stressed  that  actorness  (partially)  depends  on  how an  entity  is 
perceived by others. Interactions and exchanges of norms and practices between the national 
and the  supranational  level  –  in  this  case  the  European  Union –  feature  centrally  in  the 
debate.12 The second strand of literature has devised a range of specific criteria for measuring 
the degree of actorness. This article adopts a fourfold analysis based on the conceptualization 
of  actorness  developed  by  Jupille  and  Caporaso,  which  provides  a  good  yardstick  for 
empirical  measurement.13 They  propose  a  model,  in  which  actorness  is  derived  from the 
interrelated criteria of recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion.
The extent to which the European Union is an actor in Arctic governance depends, firstly, 
on  its  de  jure  and de  facto  recognition.  The  former  implies  official  membership  in 
international  organizations  –  such  as  the  Arctic  bodies  and  United  Nations  framework 
organizations – while the latter denotes the degree to which the EU is (informally) accepted as 
an actor by third parties.  Jupille and Caporaso argue that intensive interactions with third 
parties  are  an  indicator  for  de  facto recognition.  If  the  European  Union is  not  a  formal 
member of an international organization, but third parties still enter into dialogue with the EU,  
it  is  a clear indicator of recognition.  Secondly,  when assessing the European Union as an 
international actor, its authority to act internationally needs to be analysed. Authority relates 
to  the  formal  legal  competences  that  the  European  Union  possesses.  Authority  in  the 
European Union can take the form of exclusive competences, as for example in the Common 
Commercial Policy (i.e. external trade policy), mixed competences between the European and 
the national level, and purely national competences.14 In the actorness model, the authority to 
act  thus ultimately lies with the member states, which have delegated power in particular 
issue areas to the European Union in order to act collectively.
A third requirement for actorness is that the European Union possesses a certain degree 
of autonomy from its constituent member states. After all, if the EU in a particular issue area 
does not consist of more than the sum of its parts, it is the parts themselves, which are worth 
analysing as international actors – not the collectivity. The relevant indicator concerns the 
existence of a distinctive institutional  apparatus,  with for example includes  a role for the 
European Commission. The presence of EU institutions alone in an issue area is, however, not 
enough. They also need to have a certain independence from the member states when making 
decisions. Finally, Jupille and Caporaso argue that cohesion in the formulation of policy is a 
precondition for actorness. Cohesion works both horizontally between different actors within 
the  European Union (e.g.  Commission versus  Council)  as  well  as  vertically  between the 
European and the national level.15 A lack of horizontal and/or vertical cohesion can undermine 
the European Union when acting on the international scene. If the spokesperson for Europe 
10 W. Wallace, 'Less than a Federation, More than a Regime: the Community as a Political System', in Policy Making 
in the European Community, eds. H. Wallace, W. Wallace & C. Webb (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1983), 403-
436.
11 Sjöstedt, n. 1 above; Bretherton & Vogler, n. 1 above; Jupille & Caporaso, n. 1 above.
12 Ginsberg, n. 3 above; Bretherton & Vogler, n. 1 above.
13 Jupille & Caporaso, n. 1 above.
14 Article 2-6, TFEU.
15 Cf. S. Nuttall, 'Coherence and Consistency', in International Relations and the European Union, eds. C. Hill & M. 
Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 91-112.
does not have the complete backing of the member states and the other EU institutions, third 
parties might prefer to do business with the other European actors.
III EU Actorness in Arctic Governance
An examination of the EU’s engagement in Arctic governance serves as a practical example 
for assessing its capacity to establish as a genuine international actor. First, in light of the geo-
strategic importance of the Arctic, strengthening the EU’s position in the international arena 
has become a factual imperative. Second – and closely interrelated – the Union has recently 
undertaken  considerable  efforts  to  increase  its  engagement  in  the  region,  stressing  its 
willingness to assume a key position.16 The fact that eventually no permanent observer status 
in the Arctic Council was granted, however, has shown that this has proven to be an arduous 
task. Lastly, the Arctic is an illustrative example of an area in which actor constellations are  
not  fixed  yet.  All  Arctic  states  (and  other  stakeholders)  are  currently  developing  their 
strategies.  Analysing  the  EU’s  struggle  for  being  integrated  into  the  Arctic  governance 
structure therefore is revealing about the process of establishing as an actor and the EU’s 
ability  to  interfere  in  issues  emerging newly  on the  international  agenda.  This  section  is 
structured around the three areas of maritime affairs, border delimitation, and environmental 
matters, which cover the major disputes in Arctic governance.
1. Maritime Affairs
From the  moment  that  an  Arctic  Council  report  confirmed  that  the  scenario  of  ice-free 
summers is a question of when rather than if,  international actors have been interested in 
questions concerning the  nature  of  sea routes and maritime transport  in  the  Arctic.17 The 
former refers mainly to the legal  dispute over the Northwest Passage, which connects the 
Atlantic  with  the  Pacific  and  poses  an  alternative  for  the  heavily  used  Panama strait.  It 
shortens the route to China for European vessels by more than six thousand kilometres and 
was already open in 2007 and 2008. The legal conundrum lies in the nature of the strait.  
Based on the recognition of its sovereignty in the region, Canada claims it to be Canadian 
territorial water. It has set in motion the process of renaming the Northwest Passage into the 
Canadian Northwest and it also asserts its claims by patrolling the passage with its navy.18 In 
contrast,  the  USA and the  EU argue that  the  passage  is  an international  strait.  A similar 
problem exists with the Northern Sea Route along the Russian coast.19 
The legal status of these passages has geo-strategic significance, especially for Russia and 
the United States, which have navy bases in the Arctic. It also has considerable commercial 
implications for the EU, which has the largest merchant fleet on the planet.20 If the Northwest 
Passage  is  territorial  water  under  the  United Nations  Convention  on the  Law of  the  Sea 
(UNCLOS),  all  submarines  have  to  surface  and  all  flights  have  to  be  permitted  by  the 
Canadian government.21 In addition, the Canadian government could charge fees for passage, 
which would gravely jeopardize EU trade interest. Apart from the Northwest Passage, there is 
a second problem in maritime affairs, which concerns the regulation of maritime transport. 
Mostly, this encompasses environmental concerns about pollution emanating from vessels and 
16 Interview with Commission Official, 2010.
17 AMSA, n. 6 above.
18 D. H. Claes, Ø. Øyvind & Ø. Harsem, The New Geopolitics of the High North. Conference Paper, 2010, available at 
<http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/4/1/5/0/7/pages415079/p415079-1.php>, at 13; 
M. Byers & S. Lalonde, ‘Who controls the Northwest Passage?’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42, no. 4 
(2009): 1133-1210, at 1153; 1175. 
19 Due to its greater geopolitical and economic importance, the focus will be on the Northwest Passage.
20 P. Nopens ‘The Impact of Global Warming on the Geopolitics of the Arctic. A Historical Opportunity for Russia?’ 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, Security Policy Brief 8 (2010), at 8; Interview with 
Commission official, 2010.
21 UNCLOS, articles 19-21.
safety measures. As the Arctic is particularly sensitive for environmental damage (see also 
below),  the  regulation  of  the  expected  increasing  shipping  in  the  area  is  of  pivotal 
importance.22
Membership of the European Union in relevant international organisations is an indicator 
of the EU’s de jure recognition as part of maritime governance. The EU is party to UNCLOS 
and therefore recognised as member in its own right. Due to the global nature of maritime 
transport, UN bodies are the primary organ for regulating shipping. The EU, however, is not a 
member of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which enacts global standards for 
vessels. Neither is it a member of the Arctic Council, which issues non-binding standards for 
vessels  in  the  Arctic.23 Consequently,  the  EU  can  submit  observations  and  intervene  in 
proceedings under UNCLOS on the disputed Northwest Passage, but it has no legal standing 
in the IMO or in the Arctic Council with a view to the drafting of a regulatory framework for 
Arctic shipping. When it comes to de facto recognition, the EU is one of the key actors in the 
dispute  about  the  Northwest  Passage.  The  European  Union  is  the  only  partner  explicitly 
mentioned by the United States in its fight against Canada.24 As regards maritime transport, 
the EU is involved in many R&D projects of Arctic states and recognised for its technological 
and scientific expertise.25 Apart from its expertise, the EU’s position is not considered relevant 
to the Arctic states given the mentioned predominance of the IMO in regulating shipping. The 
EU is in favour of a more comprehensive and binding framework for Arctic shipping, while 
the  Arctic  states  are  content  with  cooperation  and  consultation  through  stressing  the 
sufficiency of the existing frameworks of IMO and the Arctic Council.26 
Regarding the Northwest Passage, the European Union has proven to wield authority by 
actively interfering in the dispute. General recognition of Canada’s claim on the Northwest  
Passage by third parties over an extended period of time would indeed make the strait internal 
waters. However, interventions by the United States and the EU when Canada put forward 
those claims render the nature of the Northwest Passage still unresolved.27 This shows that EU 
interventions count in disputes over the nature of the Northwest Passage. Beyond this, the 
European  Union  –  just  as  any  other  actor’s  authority  –  is  severely  constrained  by  the 
supremacy of the UN legal framework. The legal regulation of shipping is mostly in the hands 
of the Arctic states.28 As mentioned, the EU is in favour of a legally-binding framework of 
Arctic maritime transport and also has the means to enact this within Union waters by issuing 
legislation  on  transport  policy.  By  the  same  token  it  also  has  the  power  to  conclude 
agreements with third states in transport policy aiming for common shipping standards in the 
Arctic. However, the Arctic states do not wish for such a binding framework and rather prefer 
the existing mode of Arctic Council cooperation.29 As the EU is neither a member of the IMO, 
nor of the Arctic Council, it has little leverage in influencing their output – though not always 
binding – which still creates the existing governing framework for maritime transport. 
The EU has a distinctive institutional apparatus at its disposal by which it can carry out 
research (primarily the European Environmental Agency) and the Commission is the actor 
through which the EU participates as an ad hoc observer in the Arctic Council and is involved 
in UNCLOS. The reticence of the Arctic states towards the EU’s efforts considerably restrains 
the capacity of the European Union to act autonomously. The constraint on the Commission to  
pursue its aim of a legally-binding framework was also blocked by the Council of Ministers, 
22 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (Valencia: IPCC XXVII, 2007). 
23 E. J. Molenaar & R. Corell, 2009, Arctic Shipping. Available at <http://arctic-transform.org/download/ShipBP.pdf>, 
at 5.
24 US Congress, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 2010), at 11. 
25 A. Airoldi, The European Union and the Arctic: Policies and Actions (Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, 
2008), at 26. 
26 Council, n. 7 above, at 4; Airoldi, n. 25 above, at 65; 76.
27 Byers & Lalonde, n. 18 above, at 1153; 1175. 
28 UNCLOS, article 234.
29 Airoldi, n. 25 above, at 65; Jakobson, n. 5 above, at 10. 
which confirmed the Arctic Council as prime body for issuing Arctic polices.30 The EU is also 
dependent on non-member states, such as Norway or Russia for enacting its standards in the 
Arctic,  since  the  EU’s  own  waters  occupy  only  little  space  in  the  Arctic.  The  EU, 
consequently, has not much leverage in putting into practice its policies independently without  
support of others and can be said to score low on this dimension, constrained by its borders, 
the resistance of other relevant actors, and with the Commission held on a short leash by the 
member states.
As regards cohesion, the Northwest Passage-dispute is an example of remarkable unity 
among the member states of the European Union. The EU speaks as unitary actor and is 
perceived  as  such  by  others,  for  example  the  United  States,  the  media  and  academia. 
Important  in  this  respect  is  that the EU is  mentioned in the relevant  documents,  with no 
parallel reference to the member states.31 It is quite different in the case of the legal regime on 
maritime transport. The Arctic coastal states prefer staying among each other and discussing 
in  the  Arctic  forums  or  the  IMO.  Thus,  Denmark  does  not  share  the  Commission’s 
engagement. This prevents EU-wide support for the Commission's plans. 
In conclusion, the European Union has assumed a strong position in the dispute on the 
legal nature of the Northwest Passage. It is recognised as an actor, has authority equal to that 
of states and represents a coherent entity. The EU thus can be regarded as a fully-fledged actor  
in this dispute on new sea routes. On the other hand, the EU did not manage to get a foot in  
the door when it comes to the creation of a regulatory framework for Arctic shipping. The 
Arctic states are keen on barring any interference and managed to keep EU involvement to a 
minimum of R&D. Moreover, the EU’s absence from the most important bodies on maritime 
governance exacerbates another weakness.
2. Border Delimitation
Arctic border delimitation, barely on the political agenda for decades, has rapidly become a 
contentious  issue  after  states  became  aware  of  the  extent  of  climate  change  and  its 
consequences.  The  fact  that  the  energy-rich  Arctic  remains  the  last  territorially  unsettled 
region in  the  world has  recently heated up a  competitive  geopolitical  quest  for  territorial 
possession that culminated in the planting of the flag of the Russian Federation on the sea 
floor under the North Pole in August 2007. With Arctic ice further melting down, coastal  
states realise that it will increasingly be possible to extract hydrocarbon reserves and offshore 
oil  outside of their territories.  As energy dependence is of crucial importance,  the run for 
Arctic  territorial  possession  is  primarily  explained  by  the  right  to  resource  and  energy 
extraction that derives from ownership of the respective maritime seabed. The policy domain 
of energy is thus subsequently subsumed under the analysis of territorial distribution. Border 
delimitation  is  generally  understood  as  the  process  of  determining  the  land  or  maritime 
boundaries of a state, “including that of any continental shelf or exclusive economic zone, by 
means of geographical coordinates of latitude and longitude”.32
UNCLOS provides the most comprehensive framework dealing with territorial disputes. 
States submit territorial claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental  Shelf, 
which is then asked to give recommendations to the coastal states.33 Although the UNCLOS 
does not foresee a specific treaty regime for the Arctic, the five coastal states bordering the 
Arctic agreed that it  “provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five 
coastal States and other users of this Ocean” and that they “see no need to develop a new 
comprehensive  international  legal  regime  to  govern  the  Arctic  Ocean”.34 According  to 
30 Council, n. 7 above, at 4. 
31 Congress, n. 24 above, at 11.
32 A. Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 34.
33 UNCLOS, Annex II, Art. 3.
34 ‘Ilulissat Declaration’ (Ilulissat/Greenland, 27-29 May 2008). 
Available at <http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf>
UNCLOS Article 76, the continental shelf of coastal states comprises “the seabed and subsoil 
of  the  submarine  areas  that  extend  beyond  its  territorial  sea  throughout  the  natural 
prolongation of its land territory”. Generally speaking, coastal states are granted a so-called 
'exclusive  economic  zone'  comprising  two-hundred  nautical  miles.  Everything  beyond  is 
considered international waters. Still, coastal states can submit claims even beyond these two-
hundred nautical miles to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. As these 
claims can be overlapping, the issue of international waters’ border delimitation can become a 
contentious issue.
Since the EU as such is neither a state nor an Arctic littoral one, recognition by the other  
Arctic players is not self-evident. The Commission is a party to UNCLOS and hence a de jure 
recognized  actor.35 The  participation  of  the  European  Community  at  the  United  Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1982), however, was most controversial and met 
considerable  opposition,  especially  by  the  Soviet  Union,  precisely  because  it  meant  the 
participation of an association of states that was no unitary direct coastal state. The Soviet 
Union was thus very reluctant in de facto recognizing the European Community as an actor. 
Today, the United States and Russia are equally cautious in recognizing the EU as a legitimate 
Arctic  actor  in  border  disputes.36 Furthermore,  the  2008  Ilulissat  Declaration  was  an 
affirmation among the five Arctic coastal  states that they did not want to give away their 
respective national  grip over  Arctic  border  settlements  to any new international  regime − 
barring the European Union as a potential de facto actor in Arctic border delimitation.
Likewise, the EU cannot be said to have any authority in Arctic border delimitation. To 
speak of the EU’s authority “is to think of authority delegated to EU institutions by nation 
states”.37 As the member states that are coastal Arctic states submit claims to the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on a national basis, the European Union does not have 
own authority. Upon ratification of UNCLOS, states are given ten years to submit their claims 
for an extended maritime border.38 Denmark, for example, submitted claims for the area north 
of  the  Faroe  Islands  and  for  areas  north,  northeast  and  south  of  Greenland.  Given  that 
Denmark ratified UNCLOS in 2004, it still has time until 2014 to submit further claims. This, 
in turn, has consequences for the EU’s autonomy in border delimitation. The European Union 
does not have an autonomous say in exclusive economic zones which are deemed areas of 
national  jurisdiction under  international  sea law.39 While  the  Commission  Communication 
carefully  proposed  to  “closely  follow the  processes  of  maritime  delimitation  and  of  the 
establishment  of  the outer  limits  of  the  continental  shelves to  assess their  impact  on EU 
interests”,40 the  Council  Conclusion,  emphasised  the  “gradual  formulation  of  a  policy  on 
Arctic issues to address EU interests and responsibilities, while recognising Member States’  
legitimate interests and rights in the Arctic”.41 The Council is thus cautious not to duplicate 
the mandate of the Arctic Council and explicitly “recognises the Arctic Council as the primary 
competent body for circumpolar regional cooperation”.42 In quite clear words, the Council 
thus puts limitations on Commission plans to interfere in Arctic border delimitation. 
The EU hence remained outside the proceedings of the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf in the border disputes. In the meantime, Norway has submitted claims to 
35 T. Treves, ‘The European Community and the Law of the Sea Convention: New Developments’, in The European 
Union as an Actor in International Relations, ed. E. Cannizzaro (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), 279-296, 
at 280. 
36 M. Byers, ‘Interview: Expert decodes Arctic conflict’, UPI (2 April 2010). Available at 
<http://www.upi.com/Science_News/Resource-Wars/2010/04/02/Interview-Expert-decodes-Arctic-conflict/UPI-
36031270235949/>.; I. Traynor, ‘Europe joins international contest for Arctic resources’, The Guardian (21 
November 2008). Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/21/arctic-energy-eu>.
37 Jupille & Caporaso, n. 1 above, at 216.
38 UNCLOS, Annex 2, Article 4.
39 Interview with Commission official, 2010. 
40 Commission, n. 7 above, at 11.
41 Council, n. 7 above, at 1, emphasis added.
42 Ibid., 4.
extend its exclusive economic zone in the Loop Hole,  the Western Nansen Basin and the 
Banana Hole.43 Further unresolved disputes are between Russia and Norway in the Barents 
Sea and the North Pole, and between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island and different 
interpretations  of  the  Svalbard  Treaty  about  the  two-hundred  nautical  miles  around  this 
archipelago.44 In none of these border disputes the European Union was involved. It does not 
have  an  autonomous  say  in  Arctic  border  delimitation,  nor  does  it  have  the  necessary 
authority.
With regard to cohesion, it has been stated above how the relevant member states channel 
border  delimitation  through  national  claims  to  the  Commission  on  the  Limits  of  the 
Continental Shelf. This marginalisation of the European Union undermines the emergence of 
a unified position. A last word should also be said about institutional and horizontal cohesion 
in  this  context:  “the  main  problems  relating  to  Arctic  governance”,  the  Commission 
Communication acknowledges, “include the fragmentation of the legal framework, the lack of 
effective instruments [and] the absence of an overall policy-setting process”.45 This concisely 
summarizes  the  Union’s  shortcomings  in  Arctic  governance.  Where  absence  of  a  legal 
framework  relates  to  the  lack  of  a  specific  treaty  regime  governing  the  Arctic,  lack  of  
effective  instruments  and  absence  of  policy-setting  process  bespeak  a  still  missing 
comprehensive and coherent EU Arctic policy. Without it, the EU will not be able to interfere 
in Arctic border delimitation. 
These findings demonstrate the difficult position that the European Union has in Arctic 
cooperation. The attempts of the Arctic coastal states to keep the EU out of all discussions 
account  for  the  low  degree  of  recognition  and  autonomy.  The  absence  of  territorial 
possessions in the Arctic additionally limits  the EU’s authority  in territorial  disputes.  The 
drawing up of borders goes to the core of national sovereignty – a strict  domaine reservé – 
which considerably undermines EU actorness. The delimitation of national maritime claims is 
no exception. The EU’s low score on all four dimensions of actorness is of little surprise given 
the  topic.  Yet,  considering  the  importance  of  the  Arctic  for  the  Union’s  hobby  horse  of 
environmental protection and especially the topicality of future energy security, one might 
expect  a  more  proactive  stance  of  the  EU in  questions  of  delimiting  the  shelf  and  even 
supporting the member states in their claims. Assisting them in exploring their shelves via 
R&D projects could provide a valuable avenue for this, as only scientifically based arguments 
count before the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.46 
3. Environmental Issues
The  EU’s  commitment  to  preserving  the  Arctic  environment  touches  upon  a  variety  of 
sectoral policies, such as climate change, research, the sustainable exploitation of resources 
and animal welfare.  Environmental concerns lie at  the core of the original creation of the 
Arctic institutions and have been a driving force behind the EU’s commitment ever since.47 
From the outset, two strands of the EU’s environmental policy can be differentiated: First, the 
EU has introduced a series of policy initiatives in the area of environmental research. Second, 
several regulatory policies applicable only within the EU but with significant extra-territorial 
impact  in  the  Arctic  have  been  developed,  such  as  regulations  on  pollution,  the  use  of 
chemicals  and  animal  welfare.  This  delineation  provides  a  basis  for  more  differentiated 
conclusions about the European Union’s actorness.
Regarding the EU's de jure recognition in environmental affairs, several observations can 
43 Nopens, n. 20 above, at 6.
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be made. First,  the Arctic Council,  of which the EU is not a member,  is one of the core 
organizations for environmental matters. Needless to say, the Arctic Council does not have 
any legally binding powers and it has been extremely reluctant to issue regulatory legislation 
in  environmental  matters.48 Instead,  it  has  focused  on  a  research-based  approach  to 
environmental  protection.  In  research  matters,  however,  the  EU  has  established  a  tight 
network of cooperation with third parties, notably the Arctic Council and the United States.49 
The  European  Environment  Agency,  for  instance,  regularly  cooperates  with  the  Arctic 
Council, indicating a certain degree of de facto recognition. Second, the European Union was 
a  founding  party  of  the  Barents-Euro-Arctic  Council  and  was  initiator  of  the  Northern 
Dimension.50 It  has  therefore  de  jure recognition  in  these  forums.  Whereas  the  initial 
ambitions  of  the  Barents-Euro  Arctic  Council  in  protecting  the  Arctic  environment  have 
diminished over time due to a lack of voluntary financial contributions, the most recent policy 
action plan of the Northern Dimension lists environmental protection as a priority area.51 
In  contrast  to  these  non-regulatory  issues,  de facto recognition  in  regulatory  policies 
remains inherently difficult. Two cases in point are the EU's Regulation on the prohibition of 
leghold traps (1991) and the Regulation on the ban of seal products (2009), through which the 
Union indirectly tried to impose regulatory legislation for the Arctic environment via internal 
policies.52 In  both  cases,  the  EU responded to  the  European Parliament’s  animal  welfare 
concerns and issued regulatory policies on leghold traps and the import of seal products into 
the European Union, thereby substantially interfering with the everyday lives and traditions of 
the indigenous Arctic population. Particularly the ban of seal products has overshadowed EU-
Arctic relations ever since articles from the main newspapers in the Arctic have posed the 
legitimacy of the EU’s regulatory initiative into question. While Denmark publicly distanced 
itself  from the  Seals  Regulation  due  to  economic  interests  and  claims  by  its  indigenous 
people,  Norway  and  Canada  openly  questioned  the  Union’s  willingness  to  “promote  co-
operation and co-ordination” in the Arctic, stressing that the Regulation is a “violation of the 
EU’s  trade  obligations.53 The  Economist  responded  similarly,  calling  Members  of  the 
European Parliament “breathtakingly hypocritical”.54 
With the Single European Act, the European Community was conferred explicit authority 
to  enter  into  environmental  agreements  with  third  countries.55 Regarding  the  issuance  of 
legislation, however, the EU does not enjoy exclusive authority, as environmental policy is a 
shared  competence.  In  practice,  a  series  of  important  legislation  indirectly  enhancing the 
protection of the Arctic environment has been initiated at EU level, such as in the area of 
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chemicals.56 As argued by Airoldi, “where internal EU action in the environmental field could 
have  a  direct  impact  on  the  Arctic…it  has  already  fulfilled  much  of  its  potential”. 57 By 
contrast, the European Union does not have official authority to issue legislation with direct 
application in the Arctic. The EU has nonetheless effectively exerted indirect extra-territorial 
authority through various means including the strategic use of its intra-territorial authority to 
issue environmental laws with considerable implications for the Arctic, as exemplified by the 
Seals  Regulation  and  environmental  research.  Some  of  the  Northern  regions  of  Sweden, 
Finland but also Norway and Russia have furthermore received funding from several cohesion 
programmes.  Given the  general  lack  of  financial  support  by Arctic  regional  bodies,  these 
funds have been considered an integral feature of Arctic governance.58
The conclusion that the EU has limited extra-territorial authority also necessitates further 
investigation of the question who actually enjoys authority in Arctic environmental matters 
given that  considerable  part  of  its  territory  has  no declared ownership.  The general  legal 
frameworks applicable are multilateral environmental agreements such as the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Stockholm Convention to 
which the EU is a party.59 Hence, although the European Union’s authority is formally limited, 
it  can  be  said  to  perform  on  par  with  any  other  member  in  the  relevant  multilateral 
environmental agreements. 
Especially in environmental research, the EU has set up a comprehensive institutional 
apparatus, scoring high on the criterion of distinctiveness. The main bodies responsible are the 
European Environment Agency and various projects focusing on the Arctic, such as the Arctic  
Footprint,  Damocles  and  Arctic  Transform.60 The  EU  has  managed  to  interact  largely 
independently from its member states with third countries and the Arctic Council. At the same 
time, however, the EU’s autonomy is considerably limited by strong dependence on member 
states’ resources. Damocles as the main EU research project, for example, is lead primarily by 
three  national  institutes.61 Moreover,  as  noted  by  Airoldi,  “it  is  quite  regrettable  that, 
particularly at the stage of preparation of EU legislation, a lack of resources – human as well  
as financial – appears to have hindered or prevented Commission contacts with the Arctic 
regional bodies working on the same themes”.62 
The  EU  thus  scores  comparably  high  on  the  criterion  of  distinctiveness,  but  its 
independence  is  severely restricted by insufficient  own resources.  Similarly,  the extent  to 
which the EU can be considered an independent actor within the Arctic institutions varies. In 
addition to Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the Commission is recognized as an autonomous 
actor  in  the  Barents  Council  and  the  preamble  of  the  2006  Political  Declaration  of  the 
Northern  Dimension  lists  the  European  Union  as  principal  party.63 Whereas  the  Barents-
European-Arctic Council is characterized by double representation of the Commission and 
individual  member  states  diminishing  the  EU’s  autonomy  vis-à-vis its  member  states  in 
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practice, the picture lies differently with the Northern Dimension. As policy initiative agreed 
upon by member  states  on  the  European  level,  the  EU institutions  naturally  assume key 
positions in the elaboration of action plans and frameworks. Most importantly, in 2001 the 
Commission took a  leading role  in  the negotiations  on the  establishment  of the Northern 
Dimension Environmental Partnership, also covering the Arctic.64 
Environmental  policy is  highly complex,  involving cohesion,  climate  change,  energy, 
research and the integrated maritime policy. Although Directorate-General for Environment of 
the  European  Commission  is  recognized  as  the  main  institutional  body  responsible, 
competences  are  also  split  between  Directorates-General  External  Relations,  Maritime 
Affairs, Regional Policy and Transport and Energy.65 A high degree of cohesion even within 
the Commission therefore seems a challenging task from the outset. As primary source of 
expertise, the European Energy Agency has been a valuable link between the different actors 
on EU level. Yet, a central point of coordination is lacking. In a recent report, the Heinrich 
Böll  Foundation  argued  in  favour  of  the  creation  of  a  horizontal  Arctic  Unit  within  DG 
Environment in order to “coordinate and develop the EU’s interest and Arctic policy between 
the [different] DGs” and “increase its leverage vis-à-vis the Arctic”.66 Likewise, Denmark’s 
public alienation from the Regulation on seal products revealed considerable split in vertical 
cohesion over Arctic environmental policies and the difficulty of reconciling animal-welfare 
considerations with claims put forward by the Arctic states.
To summarize, it is important to adopt a twofold perspective when analysing the EU’s 
actorness in Arctic environmental policy. Whereas the Union scores comparably high on all  
four criteria in matters of environmental research, its efforts to exert indirect extra-territorial 
authority via regulatory policies have not only met criticism by third parties, but they have 
also split the EU internally. Opposition by the Arctic states has been particularly strong on 
questions of regulatory governance and recognition,  autonomy and vertical  cohesion have 
been markedly low. 
IV Conclusion
Against the background of the geopolitical race for the Arctic region and the EU’s growing 
interest in playing a more active role in Arctic governance, this article has analysed the degree 
of actorness of the European Union. It  has looked at  the EU's involvement  in all  Arctic-
relevant issue areas – maritime transport, border delimitation and environmental affairs. When  
measuring actorness across issue areas, it becomes clear that there is considerable variation. 
Disputes over border delimitation, in particular, remain at the core of national sovereignty. 
Third parties, but also member states, have kept the European Union at arm's length in all  
discussions.  They  have  preferred  to  deal  with  the  Commission  on  the  Limits  of  the  
Continental Shelf bilaterally. The efforts of the European Union to establish a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for Arctic shipping and protecting the environment have also resulted in  
little. On the other hand, in the domain of R&D – especially pertaining to the environment –  
the EU with its well-developed agencies and funds is one of the main players. It actively 
engages with other Arctic states and bodies via a plethora of research agreements, indicating a 
considerable degree of recognition, authority and autonomy. Finally, the EU’s actorness in the 
dispute over the Northwest Passage is equally high. It is a fully-fledged international actor in 
this issue area on par with the United States in its legal fight against Canada.
Such  variance  across  issue  areas  necessitates  an  explanation.  On  contested,  highly 
political, issues – such as border delimitation, binding rules and regulatory governance – the 
European  Union  is  absent  from  the  negotiations.  Border  delimitation  touches  upon 
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sovereignty issues, but also on future payoffs resulting from the possible energy resources 
under the Arctic. Establishing rules in the field of maritime transport and the environment will  
inevitably change the  status quo, while it is actually the  status quo  that is preferred by the 
Arctic coastal states. It is thus unsurprising that the Arctic coastal states have tried to keep the 
European Union out by means of non-recognition, undermining its authority by rejecting, for 
example, its membership of the Arctic Council, and decreasing its autonomy and cohesion, 
including through actions of the EU member states. On the other hand, as regards questions of 
a more practical and uncontested nature – such as environmental research – the European 
Union brings  useful  resources  to  the  table,  including expertise  and funding.  The one big 
exception to this dichotomy is the role of the EU in the legal dispute over the Northwest 
Passage.  In  this  instance,  it  uses  its  economic  weight  in  world  affairs  to  safeguard  its 
commercial interests. It also helps that the European Union is recognised by the United States 
and that it  is fully  supported by all the member states. This gives it  a particularly strong 
degree of actorness.
Needless to say, the Arctic region is only one case, in which the European Union tries 
to act on the international stage. It is nonetheless an important region, because of the rapidly 
changing geopolitical situation. One decade ago, few states paid attention to the Arctic. Yet in 
the last few years many international actors are developing policies to deal with these new 
challenges. The European Union is developing such policies as well, but as this article has 
shown,  it  cannot  be  counted  as  a  fully-fledged  international  actor.  What  is,  however, 
particularly interesting is the variation across policy areas. As was to be expected, the EU is  
capable of defending its economic interests, but the extra-territorial impact of its internal rules 
and regulations remains limited. In addition, while the European Union is supposed to be a 
champion of climate change, it can only play a limited role with regard to the environment. 
Part of this has to do with its ambiguous international status and recognition, but it is also a 
matter  of  internal  cohesion  and  autonomy.  Finally,  one  needs  to  avoid  simplistic  and 
generalising conclusions, as every actor and stakeholder in the region is about to develop its 
policies. The European Union obviously cannot be said to have a fully-fledged Arctic policy 
yet in a relatively early stage of priority and interest formation. What we perceive is a process 
of ‘actorness in the making’. Before embarking on the course of academic stylisation which 
ultimately may lead to a distortion of reality, one should follow with curiosity the emergence 
of Arctic policies on the side of all actors concerned.  
